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Abstract
Using annual data over the post-World War I-period, we estimate a fundamentals-based
empirical model for the dividend-price ratio of Danish stocks. The key fundamentals-variable
is a time-varying discount rate, decomposed into time-varying measures for the growth-
adjusted real interest rate and the risk premium on stocks. In addition, the model includes
real dividends and the lagged dividend-price ratio as explanatory variables. Results show
that the model suffers from structural breaks over the sample. Using a two-state regime-
switching approach to capture non-modeled shifts in the economic environment, we find that
all fundamentals are highly significant in at least one regime and, moreover, obtain a good
fit. The model identifies two very persistent regimes characterized by a ‘low’, respectively,
‘high’ dividend-price ratio.
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21.        Introduction
In empirical finance the dividend-price ratio, defined as the ratio between a given periods
dividend payments per share and the end-of-period stock price per share, is often - explicitly
or implicitly - used as an indicator of whether stock prices are (too) high or (too) low. For
instance, Campbell and Sheller (1998) report a very gloomy prediction for the US stock
market based on the fact that the dividend-price ratio has fallen far below its historical mean,
suggesting an overvalued stock market. Fama and French (1988) and Hodrick (1992) are
other examples of the numerous studies that use dividend-price to forecast future stock
returns, see also the survey in Campbell et al. (1997, Chp. 7).
However, according to standard finance theory one should expect time variation in the
dividend-price ratio as a result of changes in the underlying economic fundamentals, in
particular changes in the (ex ante) real interest rate and the risk premium on stocks relative to
bonds. Hence, it is crucial to consider the economic fundamentals when using the dividend-
price ratio to judge whether stocks are fairly valued or not. For this purpose we need an
economic model for dividend-price. This is the topic of the present paper. Motivated by a
Gordon growth type model which is modified to incorporate a time-varying discount rate, we
formulate an empirical model using a real interest rate proxy, a proxy for the risk premium
and the level of real dividend payments as explanatory variables. The real interest rate and
risk premium proxies together capture the effects from the time-varying discount rate while
the inclusion of real dividends allows for the possibility that innovations in dividends are
reflected less than proportionately in stock prices. We also include lagged dividend-price in
the model to allow for slow adjustment in the dividend-price ratio to long-run equilibrium.
The economic model is estimated for the aggregate Danish stock market, using annual
observations for the period 1927-1996. All variables turn out to be significant with the right
signs and a reasonably good fit is obtained. However, the model suffers from structural
breaks as the coefficients to the explanatory variables are highly unstable. This suggests that
we have omitted an important (or several important) fundamental variable(s). In the Danish
case, a possible explanation for a structural break is a change in investor taxation as of 1983,
i.e., the introduction of a separate pension fund tax on bond investments, affecting the
3relative profitability of stock investments (cf. below). Modifying the economic framework in
order to take account of the omitted variable is obviously the ideal solution in such a
situation. However, in practice this may not always be realistic or even possible because the
omitted variable may be difficult (or impossible) to identify and, subsequently, quantify.
When modeling the effects of investor taxes in a heterogeneous tax system as the Danish
where tax rates differ significantly across investor groups, it is essential to correctly identify,
at every single point of time, the ‘marginal investor’, defined as the stock investor who has a
reservation price or willingness-to-pay for stocks which at the margin is equal to the
prevailing stock price. However, the ‘marginal investor’ is unobservable and, hence, the
inclusion of investor taxes in the model is a difficult task. In the case of the new pension fund
tax, matters are, moreover, complicated by the gradual implementation of the tax.
In this paper, we take a short-cut by estimating the economic model using the two-state
regime-switching approach of Hamilton (1990). We consider this approach to be a practical
tool of incorporating and indirectly modeling the omitted factor(s) which give rise to the
structural breaks that we encounter in the one-regime specification, without having to
explicitly model those factors. The regime-switching approach is based on the assumption
that the economic model differs across (a finite number of) distinct regimes, whose timing is
governed by an exogenous, discrete and latent state-variable. This means that the type of
omitted factors which we can capture by this approach are the more persistent factors that
relate to the ‘economic environment’ of the model and that result in the outcome of distinct
regimes over time with distinct economic models. Such factors often relate to the institutional
or policy framework of the economy, leading to distinct policy or institutional regimes over
time, and are typically also the factors that are difficult to model. We find in our case that the
regimes identified by the regime-switching approach are highly persistent which is consistent
with the interpretation that the omitted factor(s) represents changes in the economic
environment rather than being an additional temporary explanatory variable. In particular, we
conjecture that the identified regimes may be given the interpretation of different tax policy
regimes.
4Beyond providing a practical modeling tool, we also consider the analysis based on the
regime-switching approach to be a useful step in identifying the possible omitted factor(s)
because the results provide valuable insight regarding the timing of regime-shifts, without
being conditioned on apriori information. Hence, the regime-switching model lets the data
determine if and when regime shifts occur. This information can consequently be used to
identify candidates for omitted factors by examining relevant institutional or policy changes
around these dates of regime-shifts.
The regime-switching approach of Hamilton (1990) has previously been used in the empirical
literature to model asset pricing in situations where the pricing process changes over time,
e.g. due to shifts in the process governing economic fundamentals (for instance as a result of
policy regime shifts), shifts in the predominance of different investor types over time or
changes in the institutional set up or taxation rules of relevance for the stock market. The
importance of regime-shifts in the pricing process has recently been emphasized for the US
stock market by Driffill and Sola (1998) who motivate shifts in the pricing process with
regime-shifts in the underlying process for dividends, cf. the discussion at the end of this
paper. The possible influence of different investor types with different investment rules has
been examined for the currency market by Vigfusson (1996), who assumes that the market on
a high-frequency (daily) basis shifts between being driven by chartists and fundamentalists. In
the context of the stock market, a potential motivation for time differences in investment and,
hence, pricing rules could be that the market misprices stocks in high-inflation regimes by
using nominal rather than real interest rates, whereas investors may price stocks more
correctly in low-inflation regimes, cf. Modigliani and Cohn (1979), who argue that US stocks
were mispriced (undervalued) in the high-inflation regime of the 1970s. In such a setting we
should apriori expect the regimes identified by the regime-switching approach to be identical
to different inflationary regimes. In this paper, we do not attempt at formally explaining the
regime shifts but the working hypothesis motivating the use of the regime-switching
approach is that the regime shifts are related to (persistent) changes in the ‘economic
environment’, leading to (persistent) shifts in the economic model linking dividend-price to
the economic fundamentals. We conjecture that changes in investor taxation is a prime
candidate but institutional changes or changes in the processes for the economic
5fundamentals leading to changes in expectations formation and hence the economic model
may do as well1. In any case, a closer examination of the causes underlying the regime shifts
would be interesting but this is left for future work.
Results from estimating the regime-switching model show that all the fundamentals variables
including the real interest rate and the risk premium are highly significant in at least one
regime. Hence, we have succeeded in modeling a time-varying discount rate, here
decomposed into a time-varying real interest rate and a time-varying risk premium, which is
empirically significant in explaining the dividend-price ratio. This is an innovation compared
to the existing empirical literature where the discount rate is either assumed to be fixed or not
quantified directly (no closed-form measure) when modeling the behavior of the dividend-
price ratio or, more generally, stock prices, cf. e.g. Driffill and Sola (1998), Froot and
Obstfeld (1991) and Campbell et al. (1997, Chp. 7). Our model is not perfect in terms of
misspecification tests but passes at a 5% significance level, is stable over time and provides a
rather good fit to dividend-price. Moreover, results show that two regimes are both necessary
and sufficient to remove the structural breaks from the underlying economic model. The
model clearly identifies 3 distinct subperiods over which the regimes reign (1927-1949,1950-
1985 and 1986-1991), thereby providing valuable insight which can be used in inferring the
possible causes of the two regimes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we formulate an operational empirical
model, based on a simple and ad hoc theoretical framework which is derived from the
standard Gordon growth model by allowing for a time-varying discount rate. The data is
reviewed in section 3. In section 4 we, first, estimate the economic model under the
assumption that only one regime applies, i.e., assuming that the model is stable over the
entire sample. In section 5, we estimate the regime-switching model allowing for two distinct
regimes. Section 6 finally concludes the paper.
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  To illustrate, consider a change in the process for the real interest rate leading to increased short-run volatility.
This may imply that investors put less emphasis on the current level of the real interest rate when forming
expectations about the future long-run, average real interest rate, which is the relevant measure for the pricing of
stocks. The implication is a change in the economic model with a smaller coefficient to the current real interest
rate.
62.        The Empirical Model
In formulating the empirical model, we take as a starting point the textbook Gordon growth
model for the price of a stock with a constant discount rate and constant expected dividend-
growth, see Gordon (1962) or Campbell et al. (1997). We modify Gordon´s model in a rather
simple way to allow for time variation in the discount rate, reflecting time variation in both
the real interest rate and the risk premium on stocks. The resulting theoretical framework is
ad hoc but allows us to formulate an operational empirical model with specific candidates for
economic variables that may explain dividend-price. The theoretical model can, basically, be
interpreted as an assumption that market participants at each point in time price stocks
according to the constant-discount-rate-and-constant-dividend-growth Gordon model, i.e., as
if the discount rate and dividend-growth were in fact constant, while using the prevailing
levels for nominal bond returns, expected nominal dividend growth and the risk premium on
stocks as determinants2.
Thus, let the equilibrium in stock and bond markets at each point in time t be described by a
no-arbitrage relation stating that the expected (nominal) return on stocks Et[St+1] from time t
to t+1 should be equal to the corresponding (nominal) return on bonds Bt augmented by a risk
premium (t on stocks relative to bonds:
(1) [ ]E S Bt t t t+ = +1 g
We take Bt to be the yield-to-maturity on a (one-period) bond so that it is predetermined and
known as of time t.
The return on stocks is given as the sum of capital gains and dividend yield:
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  Campbell and Shiller (1988) have generalized Gordon’s growth model to take account of a stochastic, time-
varying discount rate, the so-called “dynamic Gordon growth model”. However, their model is (at least in its
general version) not as operational as the one we formulate. In particular, the Campbell and Shiller (1988)
model does not entail a closed-form expression for the time-varying discount rate. Our assumptions on
expectations formation, basically, imply that stocks can be priced within the original Gordon model despite the
fact that the discount rate (and dividend growth) vary over time.
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where Pt is the ex dividend price per share as of time t (i.e., at the beginning of period t+1)
and Dt+1 is the dividend payment per share paid during period t+1.
Even though Bt and (t are allowed to vary stochastically over time, we shall assume that
market participants only form point expectations wrt. future bond returns and risk premia,
i.e., “Certainty Equivalence” is assumed to apply. Moreover, we assume that market
participants expect bond returns and risk premia to be constant over time, so that any
innovations in the two variables are expected to be permanent. These assumptions - while
clearly restrictive in a theoretical setting - allow us to set up an empirically tractable model.
Thus, under the additional Gordon assumption of constant expected dividend growth, (1) can
be solved by forward recursion to give the following no-bubble solution for the dividend-
price ratio (assuming that Rt+(t>0):
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Gt is the expected nominal growth in dividends per share as of time t. Gt is also allowed to
vary over time. According to (3), the dividend-price ratio is in equilibrium equal to the sum
of the (ex ante) growth-adjusted real interest rate Rt”Bt-Gt and the risk premium on stocks (t.
(3) resembles the solution of the standard Gordon growth model with the main difference
being the allowed variation in the real interest rate and the risk premium and, hence, the
discount rate (the sum of the two).
Based on (3), we set up the empirical model:
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8where ,t is the residual of the equation. We have augmented the model by including the
lagged dividend-price ratio (D/P)t-1 and the log-level of real dividends per share DRt as
additional candidate explanatory variables. The introduction of the former allows for slow or
partial adjustment in the dividend-price ratio so that (3) (or rather the long-run solution to
(4)) is basically thought of as a model for the long run, providing us with an equilibrium
relation to which dividend-price adjusts in the long run. The introduction of DRt allows for
the possibility that real stock prices may react more or less than proportional to innovations in
real dividend payments. According to (3), the relation between real stock prices and real
dividends should be proportional as the dividend-price ratio is unaffected by innovations in
dividends. The reason is that market participants expect any innovation in current dividends
to be permanent under the Gordon constant-dividend-growth setting. However, this may not
be the case empirically. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) and Driffill and Sola (1998) also include
real dividends in their models for the price-dividend ratio (the inverse of the dividend-price)
in order to capture the possibility of “intrinsic bubbles” in stock prices, i.e., rational bubbles
that depend on fundamental variables. As standard in empirical analysis, we allow for a
constant term in (4), even though not strictly implied by the theoretical model. Hence, we
intend to explain the variations in rather than the actual levels of the dividend-price ratio3.
The challenge facing (4) is the fact that the real interest rate Rt and the risk premium (t are
unobservable. We, therefore, have to use suitable proxies for these two variables.
3.        The Data
The data are depicted in Figures 1-4. The source database is Nielsen, Olesen and Risager
(1999) which comprises data for the Danish stock and bond markets. Stock market data relate
to the aggregate market level of all Danish firms listed at the Copenhagen Stock Exchange.
The market index by Statistics Denmark is used for stock prices while dividend payments are
estimated from a large sample of firms, cf. Nielsen, Olesen and Risager (1999) for further
details. Bond data relate to the markets for government bonds. All observations are annual.
                                                          
3
  Note that according to the constant-discount-rate Gordon model, all regressors in (4) should be insignificant,
implying that the dividend-price ratio would, basically, follow a white noise process around a constant mean.
However, the latter assumption is clearly violated by the data on dividend-price, cf. below, as we observe
systematic deviations in the ratio from its mean. It is these systematic deviations that we intend to explain.
9The empirical analysis in the following sections uses the sample period 1927-1991 which is
the longest available sample for all variables.
< Insert Figures 1-4 around here >
Figure 1 shows the dividend-price ratio over the period 1927-1996. The plot suggests a
cyclical component in the ratio with large and often persistent deviations from its sample
mean, in particular, in the first half of the period. For instance, stock prices seem to have been
persistently low compared to dividends in the first half of the 1950s while stock prices were
high during World War II. In relative terms, the ratio is often subject to large year-by-year
changes where in particular the drop in the ratio from 5.2% in 1982 to 1.8% in 1983 (a
decrease of 65% in relative terms) attracts attention. This fall which is a result of capital gains
on stocks of 114% that year coincides with at least two important events in the Danish
economy. First of all, there was a major shift in economic policy as a new conservative-
liberal government came into office in September 1982, emphasizing tight economic policies
including a fixed exchange rate policy. Second, a new tax was introduced on the returns on
pensions funds’ bond holdings while the returns on stocks were exempted from taxation4.
This ceteris paribus gave pension funds an incentive to invest more in stocks and less in
bonds. We can also observe that the dividend-price ratio has been at a historically low level
since 1983. The post-1983 average is 1.7% which compares to an average of 5.1% over the
years before 1983. This persistent low level is a key issue in understanding the mechanisms
which determine the dividend-price ratio and it is, in particular, of interest to know whether it
can be explained by economic fundamentals or whether it marks a new regime compared to
the pre-1983 history.
The proxy used for the latent growth-adjusted real interest rate Rt is plotted in Figure 2. The
real interest rate as of time t is constructed as the 5-year yield-to-maturity on government
bonds at time t minus the realized growth in nominal dividends over the corresponding 5-year
period following time t. The proxy is an ex post (or perfect foresight) growth-adjusted real
interest rate where the use of growth in nominal dividends to take account of inflation and
10
real growth is consistent with the theoretical framework of section 2. Because of the forward-
looking nature of the proxy, we loose 5 observations towards the end of the period so that the
sample effectively ends in 19915.
It is evident from Figure 2 that the real interest rate proxy is highly volatile. The fluctuations
are mainly driven by the variation in the dividend growth part of the proxy, as the 5-year
nominal bond return is much more stable on a year-by-year basis. For instance, the low levels
of the real interest rate in the 1940s is due to high future dividend growth which is not
accompanied by high nominal bond returns. Due to a non-credible stance of economic policy
(amongst other things), the Danish economy experienced very high nominal and real interest
rates towards the end of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s. Nominal interest rates
declined following the new policy regime as of late 1982, but nominal dividend growth
declined likewise, sustaining the high real interest rate level until the end of the 1980s.
To construct a proxy for the risk premium on stocks (t, we draw on Olesen and Risager
(1999) who test whether the Danish premium on stocks, defined as the excess of stock returns
over bond returns, can be predicted from a set of possible predictor variables such as the
dividend price ratio, dividend yield, bond returns, lagged equity premia etc. They conclude
that the 5-year premium on stocks is predictable from the dividend yield, the 5-year bond
return and past 1-year equity premia, see Olesen and Risager (1999) for details. This
predicted or fitted 5 year premium can in an efficient markets framework be interpreted as an
estimate of the risk premium on stocks relative to bonds. However, Olesen and Risager
(1999) use the dividend yield as a predictor, and the dividend yield comes close to the
dividend-price ratio variable. In terms of (4), one could therefore possibly argue that when
using the fitted premium in Olesen and Risager (1999) as the risk premium proxy (t, we
                                                                                                                                                                                   
4
  This tax was passed by the Parliament in 1983 and took effect as of Jan 1 1984. Because pension savings
before 1984 were exempted from taxation, the tax was phased in gradually.
5
  Data for bond yields are available for the 1-, 5- and 10-year maturities, cf. Nielsen, Olesen and Risager
(1999). In choosing between these horizons, we excluded the latter because using a 10-year ex post real interest
rate would imply a loss of more observations towards the end of the sample period. We excluded the 1-year
horizon because the resulting 1-year real interest rate turned out to be a very ‘noisy’ measure with large year-to-
year variability and no explanatory power wrt. the dividend-price ratio. Intuitively, the 1-year maturity also
appears to be too short in order to be of relevance for the pricing of stocks in practice.
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would basically explain the dividend-price ratio by a variable that comes close the ratio itself,
the dividend yield.
In order to be immune to this critique, we have therefore (re-)estimated a predictor model
excluding the dividend yield and the dividend-price ratio as potential predictor variables.
Following the approach of Olesen and Risager (1999), the resulting model is (standard errors
of coefficient estimates in parentheses)6:
(5) PR PR PR PRt t t t5 2 804 0113 1 0106 1 0 093 10 727 0 023 1 0 037 2 0 030 3
Ù
- - -
= - - -. . * . * . *
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
PR1t and PR5t are the equity premia, calculated as the simple difference between stock and
bond returns, over the 1-year, respectively, 5-year holding period starting at time t. PR t5
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the 5-year premium predicted or fitted from the model. According to (5), the premium on
stocks over the next 5-year period can be predicted from the preceding three years’ (known)
realizations of 1-year equity premia. The coefficients are negative which suggests a
significant mean-reverting component in stock prices. We use (5) as the proxy for the risk
premium, i.e., (t” PR t5
Ù
 
7
.  Notice that from (1), the risk premium (t should be equal to the
predicted premium on stocks so our proxy is consistent with the theoretical framework.
(t is plotted in Figure 3. The risk premium proxy is also highly volatile, in particular, towards
the end of the sample. The large drop in the risk premium in the beginning of the 1980s
partially coincides with the shift in the economic policy regime, cf. above. The large negative
risk premia in the years 1983-1985 may possibly (to some extent) be explained by the
                                                          
6
  (5) is estimated according to a ‘general-to-specific’ procedure by, first, estimating a full model where the 5-
year premium is regressed on all candidate predictor variables (bond returns, term structure components, past 1-
year equity premia) and, subsequently, removing all insignificant predictors successively, using a 5%
significance level. (5) is the resulting parsimonious model. All parameters are estimated by OLS while Newey-
West standard errors which are consistent to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the disturbance term (up
to lag 5) are used for standard errors of the coefficient estimates. The sample is the available period 1927-1992,
using overlapping observations. (5) explains 36% (=R2) of the variation in the actual 5-year equity premium.
The residual has a standard deviation of 4.5%. Notice that we differ from Olesen and Risager (1999) by using
absolute rather than logarithmic returns.
7
  The predictions of (5) come close to those reported in Olesen and Risager (1999), in particular, as regards the
significant movements and turning points in the 5-year equity premium.
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introduction of the new pension fund tax on bond returns as we ceteris paribus should expect
pension funds to demand a smaller before-tax ‘risk’ premium on stocks relative to bonds
under the new tax regime. To see this, note that with the pension fund tax the no-arbitrage
relation between stock and bond returns is modified from (1) to:
(1’) [ ]E S Bt t t t+ = - +1 1( ) *t g
where we have assumed that a pension fund is the (representative) marginal investor. J is the
pension fund tax on bond returns, (1-J)Bt is the after-tax bond return and (t* denotes the
(‘pure’) risk premium on stocks. From (1’), the before-tax premium on stocks (t, i.e., the
expected before-tax excess return on stocks (t”Et(St+1)-Bt, is related to the after-tax premium
(t
*
 by (t = -JBt+(t*. Thus, the introduction of the pension fund tax ceteris paribus lowers the
before-tax premium. For sufficiently high bond returns Bt - and bond returns were still high
in the years 1983-1985 - we may even expect a negative before-tax premium.
Notice that we could, in principle, have constructed a proxy for the ‘pure’ risk premium (t* if
we had known the relevant tax rate t for each year in the sample. However, constructing a
data series for t is impeded both by interim arrangements for the pension fund tax and by the
fact that we need to know the relevant but latent ‘marginal investor’ (which we do not).
These complications motivate our use of the ‘before-tax’ proxy (t  8  9.
                                                          
8
  We proceed by calling (t a ‘risk premium’ even though this is not entirely adequate in the presence of the
pension fund tax. Thus, with the tax, (t captures both the ‘true’ risk premium (t* and the distortionary tax effect
-JBt.
9
  We can also introduce taxes in the theoretical framework of section 2. Using (1’) instead of (1), the with-tax
solution for the dividend-price ratio is:
(3’) D
P
B G B Gt
t
t t t t t t» - - + = - +( ) *1 t g g
where the final equation follows from the relationship between (t and (t*. (3’) is actually identical to the
without-tax solution in (3). Thus, in terms of the theoretical framework, the introduction of the pension fund tax
does not matter, i.e., it does not change the solution (the structural equation) for dividend-price. The reason is
that we include the before-tax ‘risk premium’ (t which fully incorporates the stock price effects of the new tax.
Note, however, that the pension fund tax ceteris paribus lowers the level of dividend-price by lowering (t.
Moreover, it is crucial for the result that the real interest rate and the risk premium have the same quantitative
effects on dividend-price. Thus, allowing for taxes in the empirical model (4) (replacing Rt and (t with the after-
tax real interest rate (1-J)Bt-Gt and the ‘true’ risk premium (t*, respectively, and rewriting) we get:
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Both the real interest rate proxy and the risk premium proxy are negative in some of the years
and the sum of the two proxies also turns out to be negative occasionally. The latter is
obviously not consistent with the theoretical framework of section 2 which requires the
discount rate Rt+(t to be strictly positive in order to result in a well-defined (finite) forward-
looking stock price solution. The estimation results to follow, however, suggest that market
participants - in contrast with theory - expect a significant degree of mean reversion in the
real interest rate and the risk premium so that negative values for the current real interest rate
and the current risk premium may apriori be perfectly valid because it is expected to be a
temporary phenomenon. Moreover, in terms of the empirical model (4), what matters are the
variations in the real interest rate and the risk premium proxies over time (in which we may
have more confidence) rather than the actual levels.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the log-level of real dividend payments. Dividends show some
turbulence in the beginning and towards the end of the sample but have otherwise shown a
steady declining trend.
4.        Results Using a One-Regime Approach
Column 2 in Table 1 reports the results from estimating (4) over the entire sample 1927-
1991, assuming that only one regime prevails. The estimation is performed by the Maximum
Likelihood (ML) method under the assumption that the disturbance term of (4) is normal and
independent distributed over time with homoskedastic variance (,t ~ Nid(0,F2)). The ML
coefficient estimates are identical to those obtained by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
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The pension fund tax leaves the structural model unchanged iff the coefficients $1 and $2 are identical. If the
coefficients differ, an additional explanatory variable JBt, capturing the tax distortion, is introduced into the
model. As the results will show, cf. below, the latter is the relevant case empirically and we should apriori
expect a regime-shift in the empirical model at the time of the introduction of the new tax (because the
additional variable is not included). Therefore, in a more general setting than (3), we can not be sure that the
structural model for dividend-price will be unaffected by the pension fund tax and, hence, the question of
whether or not the model survives becomes an empirical issue. The empirical results suggest that the inclusion
of the pension fund tax in the risk premium construction (t does not sufficiently account for the effects of this
tax on dividend-price, as we estimate a structural break in the model (a regime-shift) in the mid-1980s, cf.
section 5 below.
14
< Table 1 >
Using the ML standard errors, all coefficients are highly significant. The real interest rate and
the risk premium have the expected positive effects on the dividend-price ratio. The
magnitudes are, however, less than predicted by theory. This applies both to the ‘short run
effects’ (coefficients of 0.0345 and 0.1444, respectively, cf. Table 1) and the ‘long run
effects’ (0.062 and 0.259, respectively)10, where the latter take account of the evident slow
adjustment in the dividend-price process, cf. below. According to the theoretical framework
of section 2, we should expect a coefficient of one for both variables but this value falls far
above the point estimates and the deviations are much larger than what the uncertainty of the
coefficient estimates allows for. When inspecting Figures 1 through 3, the result is not
surprising as the variation intervals for the real interest rate and the risk premium are much
larger than for the dividend-price ratio. This result suggests, tentatively, that market
participants do not expect innovations in the two variables to be permanent, as assumed in
the theoretical framework, but that they expect some significant degree of mean reversion in
the real interest rate and the risk premium so that current realizations of the variables receive
(relatively) less weight11. The mean reversion feature seems perfectly reasonable from the
time series behavior of the two variables, cf. Figures 2 and 3.
Real dividends also have a significant effect on dividend-price. The effect is positive,
implying that an increase in real dividends gives rise to a less than proportional increase in
real stock prices. This is, again, a deviation from theory and suggests that market participants
do not consider innovations in dividends to be permanent but expect some degree of mean
reversion.
Finally, the significance of lagged dividend-price indicates slow or partial adjustment in the
dividend-price process to its long-run equilibrium.
                                                          
10
  By dividing through by one minus the autoregressive coefficient 0.4433 in the model of Table 1, the long-run
equilibrium model for dividend-price becomes (ignoring the residual term): 
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11
  Of course, the result may also suggest that the proxies used for the real interest rate and the risk premium are
too volatile. However, the high significance of the proxies validates their use.
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Figure 5 illustrates the fit of the model. The one-regime model seems to work reasonably well
and is, in particular, able to track the significant fall in dividend-price in 1983. There are,
however, also episodes of systematic under- or overvaluation of dividend-price, see for
instance the periods 1946-1956 and 1985-1991.
< Figure 5 >
The model passes the White and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) specification tests for serial
correlation (at lag 1) and heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in the residual term, using conventional
significance levels, see the bottom half of Table 112. There is, however, strong evidence of
serial correlation at higher lags (AR(3) and AR(5)) leading to a rejection of the model. Note
that the documented serial correlation implies that the coefficient estimates are inconsistent,
given the presence of the lagged dependent dividend-price as a regressor. The coefficients
should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Another severe problem with the model is that is highly unstable over time. Figures 6-10
show recursive estimates of the model coefficients including 95% confidence bands, obtained
by recursive least squares. With the exception of the risk premium, the coefficients are very
unstable and there is a strong indication of a structural break in the model both in the
beginning and towards the end of the sample.
< Figures 6-10 >
The apparent instability of the model can be further documented by formal testing. The
Andrews test, see Table 1, allows one to perform a test for structural break without having to
pre-specify a candidate time for a breakpoint, see Andrews (1993) and Hamilton (1996) for
details. The Andrews test procedure basically performs a LM test for a shift in the mean at
each point in the sample, except for the first 15% and the last 15% of the observations. One
                                                          
12
  The tests are documented in Hamilton (1996). We use the suggested small-sample versions of the tests
whereby the asymptotic test is transformed to a small-sample test based on the F-distribution. The tests for
autocorrelation are tests for an AR(1) process in the residual term.
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then chooses the observation with the highest LM test value and compares with critical test
values, as tabulated in Andrews (1993).  The evidence for the one-regime model is a clear
indication of a (at least one) structural break in the sample. Hence, the Andrews (1993) test
statistic is 23 which should be compared to critical values of 8.85 (5% significance level) and
12.35 (1%), that is, a clear rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural breaks. The test
statistic is obtained for the year 194713.
To conclude, the estimation results suggest that we have identified economic fundamentals
variables which have power in explaining the variations in the dividend-price ratio, including
the large fall in 1983. There are, however, specification problems with the model and there is,
in particular, strong evidence that the one-regime model is unstable over time, suggesting that
more than one regime applies over the sample period.
5.        Results Using a Regime-Switching Approach
Motivated by the evident instability of the economic model in (4), we estimate a version of
the model which allows for more than one regime. A regime is here defined as a subperiod
(or several subperiods) over which (4) is stable, i.e., over which the coefficients of the
economic fundamentals (including the constant term) and the explanatory power of the model
(as measured by the residual variance) are constant. A regime shift takes place whenever the
underlying structural framework for dividend-price changes either because of a change in the
impacts of the various fundamentals or because of a change in the non-explained part of the
volatility in dividend-price. In other words, a regime shift can be interpreted as a structural
break in the underlying economic model. We incorporate the possibility of multiple regimes
by using the Markovian regime-switching model developed by Hamilton (1990). This
approach has the advantage of letting the data - as opposed to apriori information - determine
whether there is more than one regime and, if affirmative, when the regime shifts take place.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we only allow for two regimes from the
outset and, subsequently, test whether two regimes are sufficient to eliminate the structural
breaks in (4).
                                                          
13
  The individual LM test values over the sample are reported in the Appendix.
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In the regime-switching approach, the economy can at each point of time be in one of two
possible states, as indexed by an unobservable state-variable st which takes on the values 1 or
2 14. Each regime is described by a distinct model for the dividend-price ratio:
(6)
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where the parameters depend on the prevailing state st. (6) is identical to (4) except for the
state-dependence so that the underlying economic framework is fundamentally unchanged.
The crucial difference in (6) is that we here operate with (possibly) two distinct models which
differ wrt. parameters, i.e., the coefficients $i(st) and the residual variance F(st)2.
Which model applies at a given point of time is governed by the state-variable st. st is
stochastic and is assumed to follow a two-state Markov Chain with constant transition
probabilities pij, where the latter is defined as the probability that the state (or regime) is j in
period t conditional on the state
 i in period t-1, i.e.,  pij”Pr{st=j|st-1=i} (i,j=1,2). st is by
assumption independent of the residual term ,t across all time periods, so that the state
process is exogenous to the dynamics of dividend-price.
Under the assumption that ,t is independent standard normal (,t~Nid(0,1)), we can estimate
(6) by the method of Maximum Likelihood (ML), see Hamilton (1994, Section 22). The
results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 115.
                                                          
14
  For a detailed outline of the regime-switching model including the statistical foundations, we refer to
Hamilton (1990),  Hamilton (1996) or the textbook Hamilton (1994, Section 22). Numerous applications of the
model can be found, including those in Driffill and Sola (1998), Engel and Hamilton (1990) and Hamilton and
Lin (1996).
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  We have performed the estimation under the assumption that the state probabilities of the initial observation
are given by the ergodic probabilities. Including an estimation of the initial probabilities does not change the
results significantly. The computations are performed with the BFGS algorithm in GAUSS using a variety of
different starting values. We identify more than one local maximum (a total of 5) depending on the starting
values and, moreover, encounter a singularity problem of the likelihood function, that is, for certain starting
values the likelihood becomes ‘large’ without convergence as one of the regime-dependent variances goes to
zero. The results of Table 1 apply to the local maximum with the highest likelihood. This choice is consistent
with Kiefer (1978) who shows for the mixed-distribution model - where a global maximum does not exist - that
there is a bounded local maximum of the likelihood function (with variances being positive) which exhibits the
usual maximum likelihood properties of being consistent and asymptotically efficient.
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First of all, we note that all coefficients have the expected signs. In regime #2, all coefficients
can be shown to be significant at the 1% significance level, whereas the real interest rate and
lagged dividend-price turn out to be insignificant in regime #116. The two remaining variables
(the risk premium and real dividends) are highly significant in regime #1. In fact, for the risk
premium and real dividends, the coefficient estimates do not differ much across regimes. The
results suggest that we have two regime-dependent, underlying models for dividend-price,
one in which there is partial adjustment in dividend-price and where both the real interest
rate, the risk premium and real dividends matter (regime #2), and one in which there is an
immediate adjustment and where only the risk premium and real dividends are important
(regime #1). Because the estimated residual variance is markedly higher in regime #2 than in
regime #1, the uncertainty attached to the model’s fit is larger in the former regime (despite
the model having more significant explanatory variables in this regime)17.
The autoregressive term in the dividend-price model, reflecting partial adjustment, implies
that the impact of the fundamentals variables is (slightly) stronger in the long term than in the
short term. This difference between the two horizons is most pronounced for regime #2
where the autoregressive term has the largest coefficient and the adjustment to long run
equilibrium, hence, is the slowest. The long run equilibrium relation pertaining to each
regime can be calculated from Table 1 by dividing through by one minus the autoregressive
coefficient. This leads to (ignoring the error term)18:
                                                          
16
  A Likelihood Ratio test of the joint hypothesis that the real interest rate and lagged dividend-price are
insignificant in regime #1 gives a test statistic of 3.4 with two degrees of freedom, corresponding to a critical
significance value of 18.4%. Hence, the hypothesis is accepted at conventional significance levels. We keep the
two variables in the model because the resulting parsimonious model fails the specification tests.
17
  From a probabilistic inference, cf. below, we can estimate regime #2 to have reigned over the period 1950-
1985. Using the model’s overall fit (see equation (8) below), the coefficient of determination (R2) over this
subperiod is 81%. This is considerably lower than the R2 of 96% in the remaining periods 1927-1949 and 1986-
1991 (regime #1), indicating a lower explanatory power for the model in regime #2. Over the whole sample, the
R2 is 91%. Notice that the dating of regimes is not certain so the differences should be interpreted with caution.
18
  As shown in Nielsen and Olesen (1999), the computation of the regime-dependent mean E[(D/P)t |st]  is
complicated when allowing for an autoregressive dependent term. (7) should therefore correctly be interpreted
as the expected dividend-price ratio conditional on being in regime #1, respectively regime #2 both in the
current and previous period, i.e., as E[(D/P)t |st=st-1=i] (i=1,2). However, this mean will come close to that of
E[(D/P)t |st]  whenever the regimes are persistent, which turns out to be the case for our model.
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The main difference between the two regimes is the real interest rate impact which is
insignificant in regime #1. The impact of the risk premium is also somewhat larger in regime
#2, whereas the coefficients to real dividends (and the constant terms) are almost equal across
regimes.
As was also the case for the one-regime model, both the real interest rate and the risk
premium have smaller effects than expected apriori, that is, the coefficients are less than one.
In regime #2, a permanent increase in the real interest rate by 1 percentage point will ceteris
paribus lead to an increase in the (expected) dividend-price ratio by 0.09 percentage point in
the long run. Thus, only 9% (rather than the 100% implied by the theoretical framework) of
the change in the real interest rate shows up in the dividend-price ratio. The impact of the risk
premium is somewhat higher, as an increase in the premium by 1 percentage point raises the
expected long-run dividend-price ratio by 0.16 percentage point in regime #1 (an impact of
16%) and by roughly the same magnitude in regime #2 (20%). A possible explanation is, like
before, that market participants expect a significant part of the shocks to the two variables to
be transitory.
 For the real interest rate, this may in particular be true in regime #1 (covering
the subperiods 1927-1949 and 1986-1991, cf. below) where the real interest rate is subject to
very large fluctuations, implying that a relatively large portion of the variation in the current
real interest rate is transitory (see Figure 2). This could potentially explain the low and
insignificant impact of the real interest rate in regime #1.
The level of real dividends has a significant positive impact on dividend-price so that stock
prices appear to underreact to shocks to dividends, as compared to theory. A prime candidate
for explaining this feature is, again, that shocks to dividends are expected, to some extent, to
be transitory. Because we measure dividends in log-levels, the coefficients can be interpreted
as semielasticities. From (7), a permanent 1% relative increase in real dividends will in the
long run lead to an increase in the (expected) dividend-price ratio by approximately 0.03
percentage point in both regimes.
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< Figures 11 and 12 >
The fit of the regime-switching model is illustrated in Figure 11, while Figure 12 shows the
standardized residuals. Both the fit and the residuals are calculated using the filtered
probabilities for the latent state variable st. The fitted (or expected) dividend-price ratio is
calculated across regimes as19:
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pif ” Pr{st=i|IT} (i=1,2) is the filtered probability of state i at time t, conditional on the
information set IT which contains all available information on observables (including
dividend-price) in the sample, cf. Hamilton (1994, Section 22). The state-conditioned means
E[.|st] follow immediately from (6), using the fact that the residual term has a zero mean. The
variance of dividend-price around its fitted value, VAR(Dt/Pt)”E[Dt/Pt-E(Dt/Pt)]2, can be
derived by using a formula similar to (8) for the second moment E(Dt/Pt)2 and exploiting the
fact that E((Dt/Pt)2|st)”F(st)2+(E((Dt/Pt)|st))2 (by the definition of variances). Subtracting the
term (E(Dt/Pt))2 (follows from (8)), then gives the variance. The result is:
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The uncertainty of dividend-price is a result of both the unknown error term (captured by the
first two terms in (9)) and the uncertainty arising from the fact that the state is unknown and
the state-dependent means differ (the last term in (9)). The standardized residual which is a
point estimate of the error term ,t in (6) can, finally, be calculated as the difference between
actual and fitted dividend-price, divided by the standard error of dividend-price (the square
root of (9)).
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 All moments in (8) and (9) and the following derivations are conditioned on the information set containing the
past and current levels of the explanatory variables (including lagged dividend-price) as of period t (omitted for
notational convenience).
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Figures 11 and 12 show that the model captures the significant movements in dividend-price
over most of the sample and, in particular, performs well in the beginning and towards the
end of the sample. Like the one-regime model, the regime-switching model tracks the
significant fall in dividend-price in 1983. Less appealing features are that the 1974
observation seems to be an outlier and that there are two subperiods (1947-1955 and 1958-
1968) over which the model systematically underestimates, respectively, overestimates actual
dividend-price.
The specification tests of Table 1 (bottom half) test whether the residual term of (6) is serially
uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normal distributed. The tests reveal no misspecification at
the standard 5% significance level, expect for the LM test for ARCH in regime #2. However,
using an alternative small sample correction to that used in Table 1, the test for ARCH in
regime #2 is (just) passed20. Notice that the tests for serial correlation, including the tests for
serial correlation within the two regimes, are passed so that the tendency to a systematic
under- and overestimation as noted above is not statistically significant. The Andrews (1993)
test for structural break gives a test statistic close to its critical value at the 5% significance
level. Hamilton (1996) suggests that a 1% significance level is used for this test in small
samples to correct for a possible ‘over-size’, i.e., a tendency to indicate structural breaks too
often in small samples. Using a 1% significance level, the test is passed with a comfortable
margin, that is, we accept the null that the model has no structural breaks21.
We conclude that the regime-switching model is, overall, well specified. In particular, the
model performs well in regime #1. The Andrews test suggests that two regimes are sufficient
to remove the structural breaks in the one-regime model.
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  Hamilton (1996) suggests two possible small sample corrections to the asymptotic Likelihood Ratio (LR)
test; either to transform the test to a small sample version based on the F-distribution (which is the one used in
Table 1) or to use a 1% significance level for the LR test. According to Monte Carlo simulations, both help in
correcting for an ‘over-size’ of the specification tests (that is, the tests tend to indicate misspecification too
often) in small samples. For the test for ARCH in regime #2, the LR test statistic which is asymptotically P2-
distributed with 1 degree of freedom, is 6.17. The critical significance level is 1.3%. Hence, the null of no
ARCH in regime #2 is (just) accepted at the 1% significance level.
21
  The individual LM statistics used in the Andrews test are reported in the Appendix. The test value is obtained
for the year 1969.
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According to the estimated transition probabilities, cf. Table 1, both regimes are highly
persistent with the probability of continuing in a given regime being 96-97%. The state
variable st is unobservable, but it is possible from the estimated transition probabilities and
the estimated regime-dependent models to draw a probabilistic inference about the state for
each year in the sample. This inference is expressed by the filtered state probability, that is,
the probability of the economy being in (say) regime #1 in year t, conditional on all available
sample information on observables (dividend-price and the economic fundamentals), cf. also
above. The estimated filtered probabilities, expressed as the probability of regime #1, are
shown in Figure 13. This plot confirms that the regimes are highly persistent. Furthermore, it
gives a very clear inference about the state variable, suggesting that we can divide the sample
into three distinct subperiods (using the 50% probability value as the dividing line between
subperiods); 1927-1949, where the model of regime #1 governed the dividend-price process;
1950-1985 (regime #2), and 1986-1991 (regime #1). The identification of regimes
corresponds quite well with the recursive plots of Figures 6-10 which, tentatively, indicate
that there are two regime-shifts in the sample, one in the beginning and one towards the end.
< Figure 13 >
A further understanding of the two regimes can be facilitated by inspecting Figure 14 which
shows the fit of each of the two regime-dependent models together with the actual dividend-
price ratio. It is evident that the model of regime #1 systematically predicts a lower dividend-
price ratio than that of regime #2 (over the sample, the average difference is 1.1 percentage
point). This suggests that regime #1 (#2) is one with a low (high) dividend-price ratio and -
correspondingly - a high (low) level of stock prices, taking due account of the underlying
economic fundamentals. The recent period from 1986 where regime #1 has reigned could
therefore be interpreted as a period with relatively high stock prices (even when taking
account of fundamentals). The identification of regimes suggests that this period resembles
the subperiod 1927-1949 in the beginning of the sample. The long intervening period from
1950 to 1985 has, on the other hand, been characterized by relatively low stock prices.
< Figure 14 >
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The results from estimating the regime-switching model leads to the conclusion that the
underlying economic model was subject to a structural break in both 1950 and 1986. The
evidence that a regime-shift towards a lower dividend-price ratio occurred in the 1980s seems
plausible given the large changes in the Danish economy in that period, cf. section 3. The
timing of the regime-shift (1986) may be slightly surprising because the large adjustment in
dividend-price as well as the structural changes took place in 1983. Thus, the economic
model is able to explain the significant fall in dividend-price and the underlying increase in
stock prices in 1983 without referring to a regime-shift. Using the estimated coefficients for
the prevailing regime #2, the prime factor in explaining this event is the huge fall in the risk
premium by about 11 percentage point that year which in itself explains a decline in
dividend-price by 1.7 percentage point22. Moreover, a fall in the real interest rate (by nearly
12 percentage points) and real dividends (by 30% in relative terms) contribute an estimated
0.9 and 0.6 percentage point, respectively, to the decline in dividend-price. The regime-shift
instead occurs in 1986. This shift is needed in order to explain why the dividend-price ratio
remains low despite a reversal in the real interest rate, the risk premium and real dividends
towards the levels prevailing before 1983. Tentatively, this lagged regime-shift might be
consistent with the gradual phasing in of the pension fund tax. As a more general insight, the
timing of the regime-shift in 1986 rather than 1983 highlights the importance of taking due
account of underlying economic fundamentals when estimating whether or not a regime-shift
has taken place.
The result that a regime-shift occurred in 1950 and that the pre-1950 regime should resemble
that of the post-1986 period is harder to explain and a closer examination is needed.
It is evident from Table 1 that the allowance for two regimes significantly alters the estimated
coefficients. The one-regime model does not come close to any of the regime-dependent
models and we, in particular, encounter differences for the coefficients of real dividends and
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  Recall that this large fall in the premium is partially motivated by the introduction of the new pension fund
tax, cf. section 3, so that this particular variable incorporates one of the big structural changes in 1983. Also
notice that within the regime-switching model, the pension fund tax may have induced a decline in the dividend-
price ratio via two channels; by lowering the before-tax (risk) premium gt and, potentially, by triggering the shift
to the ‘low’ dividend-price regime after 1986.
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lagged dividend-price. The regime-switching model is better than the one-regime model in
terms of fit (as measured by the likelihood or the estimated residual variances) which is no
surprise as the regime-switching model contains more parameters. However, even after
correcting for the number of parameters the regime-switching model seems superior. Table 1
shows the values of three information criteria often used as the basis for model selection; the
Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) and the Schwarz
criterion (SC). According to the first two, the regime-switching model is the preferable one,
while the SC does not give a clear answer.
There are two more evident reasons for choosing the regime-switching model. First of all, the
allowance for two regimes solves a clear problem with structural breaks in the one-regime
model. Second, within the context of the regime-switching model, a one-regime model is
valid if and only if the two regime-dependent models do not differ in any statistically
significant way. This hypothesis can be put to a formal test by, for instance, testing whether
all coefficients (including the constant term) are identical across the two regimes23. The
Likelihood Ratio test of this null hypothesis gives a test statistic of 29.7 with 5 degrees of
freedom, which corresponds to a critical significance level of 0.00%. Hence, the null is
clearly rejected. We can conclude that there are two distinct regimes in the data and the
evidence in favor of the regime-switching model is strong.
6.        Conclusion
We have estimated a fundamentals-based economic model for the dividend-price ratio.
Results show that our proxies for the growth-adjusted real interest rate and the risk premium
on stocks are significant in explaining dividend-price empirically. This identification of a
time-varying discount rate which is useful for empirical modeling is the main contribution of
this paper. The existing empirical literature on modeling stock price behavior often ignores
the time variation in the discount rate by assuming it to be constant. The estimated
coefficients of the real interest rate and the risk premium are significantly less than one, the
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  As noted by Hamilton (1990), it is not possible to perform a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of the more adequate
hypothesis that all parameters including the variances are identical across regimes. The reason is that the
asymptotic information matrix becomes singular under the null because the transition probabilities can not be
identified in the case of two identical regime-dependent models. This is a violation of one of the standard
regularity conditions underlying the LR test.
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value predicted by a Gordon-type theoretical model where all innovations in the two
variables are expected by market participants to be permanent. This result suggests that the
innovations are considered to be partially transitory. Lagged dividend-price and the level of
real dividends are also important explanatory variables. The former captures slow adjustment
in the dividend-price process while the significance of real dividends (with a positive
coefficient) shows that stock prices tend to respond less than proportionately to dividend
shocks. The latter may, again, reflect that market participants expect some of the shocks to
dividends to be transitory.
We estimate the economic model using both a one-regime and a regime-switching approach.
The latter is used to account for non-modeled changes in the exogenous ‘economic
environment’, leading to structural changes in the economic model. Results show that it is
important to allow for more than one regime over the sample in order to avoid structural
breaks. Two regimes seem to suffice. The regimes correspond to two distinct versions of the
economic model which differ wrt. the relative importance of the fundamentals variables. A
main difference is that the real interest rate (proxy) is only significant in one of the regimes.
The two regimes also differ wrt. the level of the dividend-price ratio as one of the regimes
has a systematically higher level for dividend-price than the other over the sample period
considered. One way to interpret the two regimes is therefore to distinguish them as a ‘low-
dividend-price’ regime (corresponding to a high level of stock prices) and a ‘high-dividend-
price’ regime (low stock prices). The terms ‘high’ and ‘low’ are to be used within the context
of the economic model which explicitly takes account of the underlying economic
fundamentals. Results clearly identify three distinct subperiods (1927-1949, 1950-1985 and
1986-1991) in which the regimes (submodels) apply. The high persistence of the regimes
gives plausibility to the working hypothesis that structural changes in the economy account
for the shifts in the underlying economic model. The latest regime-shift in 1986 may possibly
be explained by the gradual phasing in of a new separate tax on the returns on pension funds’
bond holdings, initiated in 1983.
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Related literature is Driffill and Sola (1998) who estimate a two-state regime-switching
model for the US stock market over the period 1900-1987, using the price-dividend ratio as
the endogenous variable. Within the context of the standard Gordon model, they motivate the
existence of two distinct states for price-dividend by the existence of two states of the
underlying dividend process - a ‘low-growth-and-high-variance’ state and a ‘high-growth-
and-low-variance’ state, respectively. These states result in two different fundamental
solutions for the price-dividend ratio. Driffill and Sola (1998) find evidence of  two states
being present in the processes for dividends and price-dividend. Furthermore, they find that
the allowance for two regimes leads to a significant improvement on the one-regime model,
in particular, in terms of fit. Driffill and Sola (1998) also test for intrinsic bubbles in stock
prices, as originally proposed by Froot and Obstfeld (1991), by allowing for the level of real
dividends to explain price-dividend. Even though they cannot formally reject the existence of
intrinsic bubbles, they conclude, based on the explanatory power of the models, that the
inclusion of intrinsic bubbles is not important when first having allowed for two different
regimes.
Our analysis differs from Driffill and Sola (1998) by using economic fundamentals, in
particular, a time-varying real interest rate and a time-varying risk premium, in explaining
dividend-price. Driffill and Sola (1998) focus exclusively on the regime-switching element,
assuming a constant discount rate24. Our motivation for using the regime-switching approach
is ad hoc in the sense that we do not provide a specific account of the causes of the regime-
shifts. Driffill and Sola (1998), on the other hand, have a more firm theoretical foundation for
the existence of distinct states in the pricing process, which is based on the existence of
distinct states in the (exogenous) underlying dividend process.
The significance of real dividends in our analysis could - as in Driffill and Sola (1998) and
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) - be suggestive of intrinsic bubbles in stock prices. However, this
conclusion is only valid if certain restrictions on the parameters of the dividends and price
processes are fulfilled, cf. Driffill and Sola (1998) and Froot and Obstfeld (1991). These have
not been tested in the present paper.
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The model we estimate provides a good fit to dividend-price, is overall well specified and
does in particular work well in regime #1 (the periods 1927-1949 and 1986-1991). The model
is not entirely satisfactory over subperiods in the middle of the sample (concentrated in
regime #2) where we encounter a tendency to under-, respectively, overestimate dividend-
price. The latter is a point where the model may be improved upon. Even though two regimes
suffice according to formal testing, one possibility would be to allow for three regimes as the
‘problematic’ subperiods may be suggestive of an additional regime. However, allowance for
a third regime increases the number of parameters to be estimated significantly (by 10).
The regime-switching model identifies regime-shifts in 1950 and 1986. An obvious but also
challenging issue for future research is to identify the causes of the regime-shifts and, if
possible, formally incorporate these as additional explanatory variables in the model. We
have conjectured that the introduction of a new pension fund tax is a possible explanation of
the regime-shift in 1986. By incorporating taxation in the economic model, the validity of
this conjecture can be tested. Moreover, it would allow us to test whether changes in taxation
also can account for the regime-shift in 1950. If so (and taxation is the sole explanation of the
regime-shifts), the inclusion of taxation would remove the structural breaks from the
underlying economic model.
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 We should add that the approach of Driffill and Sola (1998) is not applicable for Denmark as there is no
evidence of distinct states in the process for dividends.
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Figure 5.    Dividend-Price Ratio: Actual and Fitted
One-Regime Model
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Figures 6-10.    Recursive Parameter Estimates for One-Regime Model 
Recursive least squares point estimates (bold line) and 95% confidence band limits, 1942-1991. Sample start 1927.
Figure 6.   Constant term
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Figure 7.   Real Interest Rate
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Figure 8.   Risk Premium
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Figure 9.   Real Dividends
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Figure 10.    Lagged Dividend-Price Ratio
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Figure 12.     Standardized Residuals
Regime-Switching Model
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Figure 11.   Dividend-Price Ratio: Actual and Fitted
Regime-Switching Model
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1927 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991
Pe
r c
en
t
Actual
Fitted
Note:  Vertical lines indicate datings of regime #1 (1927-1949 and 1986-1991) and regime #2 (1950-1985).
Figure 13.    Filtered Probabilities for Regime #1
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Figure 14.   Dividend-Price Ratio: Actual and Regime-Dependent Predictions
Regime-Switching Model
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Note:  Vertical lines indicate datings of regime #1 (1927-1949 and 1986-1991) and regime #2 (1950-1985).
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Table 1.  Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Specification Testing:
Models with and without Regime-Switching
One-Regime
Model
Regime-Switching Model
Parameter estimates Regime #1 Regime #2
Constant term $0 -2.7186 **
(0.6976)
-5.8118 **
(0.6552)
-4.8685 **
(1.615)
Real interest rate $1 0.0345 **
(0.0127)
0.0172
(0.0112)
0.0725 **
(0.0195)
Risk premium $2 0.1444 **
(0.0250)
0.1399 **
(0.0418)
0.1535 **
(0.0242)
Real dividends $3 1.2848 **
(0.2202)
2.3701 **
(0.2414)
2.1473 **
(0.4386)
Lagged D/P $4 0.4433 **
(0.0728)
0.1143
(0.0876)
0.2456 **
(0.0913)
Variance F2 0.3719
(0.0652)
0.1255
(0.0366)
0.2296
(0.0525)
Transition probability Pii — 0.9740
(0.0291)
0.9626
(0.0295)
Ergodic probability — 0.5901 0.4099
Log-likelihood -60.0815 -43.7682
AIC 132.2 115.5
HQ 137.3 127.6
SC 145.2 146.0
White specification test  1)
Autocorrelation F(4,51) 2.737 (0.103) 2.333 (0.068)
ARCH F(4,51) 1.970 (0.166) 1.834 (0.137)
Markov specification F(4,51) — 2.199 (0.082)
LM specification test  1)
Autocorr. regime #1 F(1,51) — 0.529 (0.470)
Autocorr. regime #2 F(1,51) — 2.659 (0.109)
Autocorrelation F(1,51) 2.732 (0.104) 1.249 (0.269)
ARCH regime #1 F(1,51) — 2.493 (0.121)
ARCH regime #2 F(1,51) — 4.844 (0.032) *
ARCH F(1,51) 1.913 (0.172) 0.287 (0.595)
Standardized residuals 1)  2)
AR(1) F(1,63) 3.106 (0.083) 0.863 (0.356)
AR(3) F(3,61) 5.519 (0.002) ** 2.402 (0.076)
AR(5) F(5,59) 4.543 (0.002) ** 1.403 (0.237)
Normality P2(2) 2.810 (0.245) 3.775 (0.151)
Andrews test for
structural break  3) 23.009 ** 8.964 *
Note: Asymptotic standard errors of parameter estimates shown in parentheses, based on second derivatives of log likelihood
function. A ‘*’ shows significance at the 5% level, ‘**’ at 1% level. The Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn model selection criteria
are calculated as: AIC=-2l+2k, HQ=-2l+2ln(ln(T))k, and SC=-2l+kln(T), where l is the log-likehood value, k is the number of freely
estimated parameters and T is the number of observations.
1)   Test distributions apply to regime-switching model. For one-regime model, White and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests are
distributed F(1,59). Tests are small-sample approximations based on the F-distribution, as suggested by Hamilton (1996). Critical
significance levels in parentheses. The White and LM tests are described in Hamilton (1996).
2)   For regime-switching model, the serial correlation (AR) tests are standard LM specification tests applied to a regression of the
standardized residuals on a constant term. For one-regime model, standard LM tests on the regression equation. Normality test by
Doornik and Hansen (1994).
3)   Asymptotic critical test values are 8.85 (5% significance level) and 12.35 (1%), see Andrews (1993).
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Appendix:
Andrews (1993) Tests for Structural Break
Figure A1.   Individual LM Statistics Used in Andrews Test
One-Regime Model
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1947: 23.009
Figure A2.   Individual LM Statistics Used in Andrews Test
Regime-Switching Model
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Note:  Only observations between 1936 and 1981 (both years included) are used in the Andrews test. Period indicated by vertical 
lines.
